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The Emerging Infections Programs (EIPs), a popula-
tion-based network involving 10 state health departments
and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, com-
plement and support local, regional, and national surveil-
lance and research efforts. EIPs depend on collaboration
between public health agencies and clinical and academic
institutions to perform active, population-based surveillance
for infectious diseases; conduct applied epidemiologic and
laboratory research; implement and evaluate pilot preven-
tion and intervention projects; and provide capacity for flex-
ible public health response. Recent EIP work has included
monitoring the impact of a new conjugate vaccine on the
epidemiology of invasive pneumococcal disease, providing
the evidence base used to derive new recommendations to
prevent neonatal group B streptococcal disease, measuring
the impact of foodborne diseases in the United States, and
developing a systematic, integrated laboratory and epi-
demiologic method for syndrome-based surveillance. 
D
uring the 1980s, clinicians added newly recognized
infectious diseases, such as toxic shock syndrome and
AIDS, to their differential diagnoses when evaluating pre-
viously healthy young adults with severe illness. More
recently, clinicians in the United States found themselves
considering the possibility of inhalational anthrax among
patients with influenzalike illnesses and adding West Nile
virus infection to their workup of posttransfusion fevers
(1–3). The existence of these and dozens of other emerg-
ing and reemerging infectious diseases, naturally or inten-
tionally transmitted, has removed any doubt about the
interdependence of clinical medicine and public health.
Clinicians are sentinels for detection of new or reemerging
diseases and may benefit from information acquired
through public health surveillance and research projects,
which helps to place the quantitative risks of these new
diseases in perspective amidst the media attention that
often accompanies the latest medical mysteries. 
In 1992, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) articulated the
concept of emerging infections, discarding the naive view
that infectious diseases were problems of the past and cau-
tioning against complacency about public health prepared-
ness for infectious diseases (4). By defining emerging
infectious diseases as “new, reemerging, or drug-resistant
infections whose incidence in humans has increased with-
in the past two decades or whose incidence threatens to
increase in the near future,” IOM recognized the broad
scope of these diseases. The IOM report also cited factors
that influence the emergence of infectious diseases:
changes in human demographics and behavior; advances
in technology and changes in industry practices; economic
development and change in land-use patterns; increased
volume and speed of international travel and commerce;
microbial adaptation and change; and breakdown of public
health capacity at the local, national, and global levels. The
intentional release of anthrax in the United States in 2001
emphasized the need to add intentionally inflicted harm to
the list of factors that influence the emergence of infec-
tious diseases and to suspect the unexpected. 
In response to the IOM report, Addressing Emerging
Infectious Disease Threats to Health: A Prevention
Strategy for the United States was developed by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (5). A
key recommendation of the plan called for establishing
population-based centers to complement and support local,
regional, and national surveillance and research efforts.
This concept was realized through Emerging Infections
Programs (EIPs), a network of state health departments
(Figure 1) coordinated by CDC. EIPs are intended to be a
national resource for surveillance and epidemiologic
research by conducting work that goes beyond the routine
public health department functions; by fostering collabora-
tions between the public health, academic, and clinical
communities; and by maintaining an infrastructure flexible
enough to address new infectious diseases challenges as
they emerge. An updated plan released in 1998 described
the important role assumed by EIPs in addressing emerg-
ing infections and identified several high-priority target
areas (6), which include: antimicrobial drug resistance,
foodborne and waterborne diseases, vector-borne and
zoonotic diseases, chronic diseases caused by infectious
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USAagents, diseases transmitted through blood transfusions or
products, vaccine development and use, diseases of preg-
nant women and newborns, diseases of persons with
impaired host defenses, and diseases of travelers, immi-
grants, and refugees. We describe EIP accomplishments
and future directions. 
EIP Methods
The principal functions of EIPs are to perform active,
population-based surveillance for infectious diseases; con-
duct applied epidemiologic and laboratory research;
implement and evaluate pilot prevention and intervention
projects; and provide capacity for flexible public health
response. EIPs also develop and evaluate public health
practice and transfer what is learned to the public health
and medical communities.
These programs are supported through cooperative
agreements between CDC and state health departments,
who engage collaborators in local health departments, hos-
pitals, and academic institutions. Additional funding for
certain EIP activities comes from other sources; for exam-
ple, the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Food and
Drug Administration provide support for activities involv-
ing foodborne illnesses, and the National Vaccine Program
Office has provided support for postlicensure vaccine eval-
uations. 
The population base for EIP activities is approximately
36 million persons, though the base varies by project. This
population represents an approximation of the U.S. popu-
lation with respect to demographic characteristics such as
age, gender, race, and urban residence, as well as health
indicators such as population density and percentage of
persons at or below the poverty level (7). EIPs are geo-
graphically dispersed throughout the country (Figure 1).
Active, laboratory-based surveillance is the foundation
of two core EIP projects conducted at all sites: Active
Bacterial Core Surveillance (ABCs) and Foodborne
Disease Active Surveillance (FoodNet) (Table 1). These
active surveillance projects generate reliable estimates of
the incidence of certain infections and provide the founda-
tion for a variety of epidemiologic studies to explore risk
factors, disease spectrum, and prevention strategies (8,9).
For example, the total impact of foodborne illnesses in the
United States has been estimated by combining FoodNet
active surveillance data with other data sources and results
from FoodNet surveys of the general population (to learn
about the frequency of diarrhea in the general population
and to determine what proportion of persons with diarrhea
seeks medical care), physicians (to determine the frequen-
cy of stool-culturing by physicians), and clinical laborato-
ries (to determine the frequency of culturing for selected
foodborne pathogens) (9–11). These data provide esti-
mates of the overall occurrence of diarrheal illness (0.7 ill-
nesses/person-year), as well as the likely degree of under-
reporting for specific infections under surveillance (10). 
Other projects are conducted by EIPs, depending on
local priorities and expertise. The Unexplained Deaths and
Critical Illness (UNEX) project, a prospective study that
uses epidemiologic and laboratory methods to detect and
investigate unexplained illnesses with clinical features
suggesting infectious diseases, has been in place at four
states with EIPs since the inception of the program (12,13).
The Connecticut EIP conducts active surveillance for
emerging tick-borne diseases that are transmitted by a sin-
gle tick vector (Ixodes scapularis) in the state (14). EIPs
also strive to maintain the flexibility to meet new chal-
lenges effectively. For example, in 1996 four EIPsites con-
ducted active surveillance for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob
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Table 1. Surveillance and focus area for two core projects conducted at all Emerging Infections Program sites
a 
Projects  Type of surveillance  Focus 
Active Bacterial Core Surveillance  Active, laboratory-based  Invasive disease (isolated from a normally sterile site such as 
blood or cerebrospinal fluid) caused by group A streptococcus, 
group B streptococcus, Haemophilus influenzae, Neisseria 
meningitidis, and Streptococcus pneumoniae 
FoodNet/Foodborne Disease Active Surveillance  Active, laboratory-based  Disease (first isolation from a person) caused by 
Campylobacter, Listeria, Salmonella, Shigella, Yersinia, 
Vibrio, Shiga toxin–producing Escherichia coli, including 
O157:H7, Cryptosporidium, and Cyclospora 
aIntended to generate reliable estimates of the incidence of certain infections and provide the foundation for a variety of epidemiologic studies to explore risk factors, 
disease spectrum, and prevention strategies. 
Figure 1. Distribution of Emerging Infections Programs (EIPs), a
network of 10 state health departments and their collaborators in
local health departments, academic institutions, and clinical set-
tings, coordinated by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention. *New Mexico was added as the 10th EIP site in late
2002 and will begin EIP activities during 2003.Disease (CJD) and physician-diagnosed CJD cases. This
study contributed to surveillance methods by confirming
that death certificate reviews are a sensitive method for
detecting CJD deaths while providing some assurance that
variant CJD was not occurring in these states (15).
Impact of a New Pneumococcal Vaccine
Through ABCs, we are evaluating the effect of the
pneumococcal conjugate vaccine on the epidemiology of
invasive pneumococcal disease in the United States.
Streptococcus pneumoniae (pneumococcus), which is an
important cause of serious illness among young children,
is the leading cause of bacterial pneumonia and meningitis
in the United States. For many years, immunization against
pneumococcus with a 23-valent polysaccharide vaccine
was recommended for persons >2 years of age who are at
high risk and for all adults >65 years of age. Although dis-
ease incidence is highest in the first 2 years of life, the
polysaccharide vaccine was poorly immunogenic in this
group. In February 2000, a protein-polysaccharide pneu-
mococcal conjugate vaccine for seven pneumococcal
serotypes (Prevnar, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Pearl River,
NY) was licensed for use in infants and children (16). This
conjugate vaccine is now recommended in the United
States for all children <2 years of age, with catch-up vac-
cination schedules suggested for children 2 to 4 years of
age. In clinical trials, the vaccine was efficacious against
invasive disease in infancy and reduced nasopharyngeal
colonization by vaccine-type strains, an indication of
potential for herd immunity. 
One method used by ABCs is to collect available iso-
lates from identified cases. Serotyping data were analyzed
to learn about the epidemiology of S. pneumoniae in the
pre-conjugate vaccine era and to predict the potential
impact of the conjugate vaccine (17). Of pneumococcal
cases identified by ABCs from 1995 to 1998, at least 82%
in children <2 years of age were caused by serotypes
included in the 7-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine.
These population-based ABCs data were used to formulate
the original pneumococcal conjugate vaccine schedules
and provide recommendations for administering the vac-
cine to infants and children. When a vaccine shortage
became evident in 2001, ABCs data were again used by
public health officials to weigh alternative strategies for
delivering available doses (18). Surveillance is now
focused on evaluating changes in disease impact after the
conjugate vaccine was introduced, including whether it
interrupts transmission of antibiotic-resistant pneumococ-
ci. Analysis of ABCs data shows a substantial decline in
disease caused by serotypes in the vaccine formulation
among children in the age group for whom the vaccine is
recommended. More modest declines also occur in select-
ed adult groups (19).  
ABCs will continue to evaluate the impact of the
recently introduced pneumococcal conjugate vaccine,
including whether vaccine shortages have slowed the ini-
tial steep decline in disease occurrence. Other goals are
measurement of vaccine efficacy, assessment of whether
the vaccine is interrupting transmission, and evaluation of
the distribution of serotypes causing disease (to determine
if decline in disease because of serotypes included in the
vaccine has been counterbalanced by emergence of inva-
sive disease caused by nonvaccine serotypes). While this
“replacement disease” phenomenon was recognized for
otitis media and colonization in the prelicensure vaccine
trials, no evidence of replacement invasive disease has
thus far been recognized.
Clinicians were challenged by the emergence of mul-
tidrug-resistant pneumococci during the 1990s, when new
treatment guidelines were developed for meningitis, otitis
media, and pneumonia (20). Vaccines, in concert with
campaigns to promote appropriate use of antibiotics, pro-
vide opportunities to transform the problem of drug-resist-
ant pneumococci from a treatment dilemma to a prevention
success story (21). 
Revised Recommendations for Preventing Perinatal
Group B Streptococcal Disease
Data developed through ABCs provided a basis for
revising recommendations for the prevention of perinatal
group B streptococcal (GBS) disease. Since its emergence
in the 1970s, GBS disease has been the leading invasive
bacterial infection associated with illness and death among
newborns in the United States. Surviving infants may have
long-term developmental disabilities, such as mental retar-
dation or hearing and vision loss. Newborns at increased
risk for GBS disease are those born to women who are col-
onized with GBS in the genital or rectal areas. Although
the use of intrapartum prophylaxis has led to a 70%
decline in the incidence of GBS disease during the 1990s
(Figure 2) (22,23), early-onset GBS disease (in infants <7
days old) remains a leading cause of illness and death
among newborns. Guidelines issued in 1996 recommend-
ed either screening pregnant women for GBS colonization
by means of prenatal cultures (screening approach) or
assessing obstetric risk factors intrapartum (risk-based
approach) to identify candidates for intrapartum antibiotic
prophylaxis. 
An EIP population-based, retrospective cohort study
compared the effectiveness of prenatal screening for GBS
with the risk-based approach for preventing early-onset
GBS sepsis (24). The analysis, which combined ABCs
population-based active surveillance data on GBS cases
with a sample survey representing >600,000 deliveries,
showed that infants born to women who had been screened
for GBS before delivering had less than half the risk for
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not been screened, after adjustments were made for poten-
tial confounders. The protective effect of the screening
approach resulted mainly from broader coverage of the
population at risk because many early-onset GBS cases in
the preprevention era occurred in GBS-colonized women
without obstetric risk factors. The evidence for updated
prevention recommendations from key health organiza-
tions (i.e., American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, American Academy of Pediatrics,
American College of Nurse-Midwives, and CDC) was
based on the finding that routine screening for GBS during
pregnancy more effectively prevents cases of early-onset
disease than the risk-based approach (25). Through ABCs,
CDC will continue to monitor GBS disease trends to
understand the impact of the new recommendations and
detect potential adverse consequences of intrapartum
antibiotic use such as emergence of sepsis caused by other
organisms or new patterns of antimicrobial resistance
(26,27).  
Decrease in Bacterial Foodborne Diseases 
FoodNet documented a decrease in bacterial foodborne
illnesses from 1996 to 2001. Many infections are transmit-
ted through food and can cause illness ranging from mild
gastroenteritis to severe illness requiring hospitalization.
Foodborne pathogens cause an estimated 76 million ill-
nesses, 325,000 hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths in the
United States each year (11). Clinicians treating patients
with acute gastroenteritis are principally focused on
whether empiric antimicrobial agents are warranted and
the value of diagnostic evaluation. However, the task of
providing accurate information on trends in specific food-
borne pathogens capable of causing this syndrome, as well
as probable sources of infection, has historically fallen to
public health authorities.
Data from FoodNet documented recent declines in the
occurrence of several major bacterial foodborne illnesses
(9,28); preliminary surveillance data for 2001 were com-
pared with 1996–2000 data (28). Significant declines
occurred in major bacterial foodborne illnesses, including
infections caused by Yersinia  (49%),  Listeria  (35%),
Campylobacter (27%), and Salmonella (15%) (Figure 3).
The combined estimated incidence of infections caused by
Listeria, Campylobacter, Salmonella, and E. coli O157 in
2001 was 21% lower than in 1996, on the basis of a multi-
variate regression model.
The factors influencing the occurrence of foodborne ill-
nesses are complex. However, the observed declines in
foodborne disease incidence did occur in the context of
several control measures, including the U.S. Department
of Agriculture’s Food Safety Inspection Service’s imple-
mentation of the Pathogen Reduction/Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point regulations in meat and poultry
slaughter and processing plants, egg-quality assurance pro-
grams for Salmonella Enteritidis, and increased consumer
education in food safety (28).
FoodNet will continue to monitor the occurrence of
foodborne diseases. In 2003, FoodNet will also conduct
studies of the consequences of and risk factors for illness
caused by S. Enteritidis, S. Newport, and illness in infants
caused by Campylobacter and Salmonella. Other activities
include a project to improve collection and transport of
specimens during outbreaks so that a cause is identified in
a higher percentage of outbreaks. 
Rapid identification of a cause for cases of infectious
diarrhea and appropriate reporting of cases of foodborne
illnesses to state or local public health authorities are
important not only in identifying and controlling outbreaks
but also for more precise assessments of the local, region-
784 Emerging Infectious Diseases • Vol. 9, No. 7, July 2003
SYNOPSES
Figure 2. Incidence of early- and late-onset invasive group B strep-
tococcal disease in three active surveillance areas (California,
Georgia, and Tennessee), 1990–1998, and activities for the pre-
vention of group B streptococcal disease (22). CDC, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention. ACOG, American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists; AAP, American Academy of
Pediatrics.
Figure 3. Relative rates compared with 1996, adjusted for sites, of
laboratory-diagnosed cases of Campylobacter,  Salmonella, and
Shigella, by year, FoodNet, United States, 1996–2001 (28).
Bacterial pathogens with highest incidences of the 10 studied dis-
eases are shown.al, and national trends in foodborne illnesses (29). In turn,
such estimates can inform clinicians of likely causes, prob-
able sources, and prognostic factors for episodes of illness
in persons under their care.
Unexplained Deaths and Critical Illnesses Project 
Many clinicians have treated patients with puzzling sit-
uations, in which the acute onset of a critical illness sug-
gestive of an infectious origin occurred in otherwise
healthy young people for whom diagnostic tests failed to
identify an etiologic agent. Occasionally, such episodes are
retrospectively diagnosed many years later with the recog-
nition of a new infectious disease and testing of stored
clinical specimens. For example, hantavirus pulmonary
syndrome was first recognized and described in the United
States in 1993 by an alert clinician during an outbreak in
the Southwest (30); retrospective reviews of fatal illnesses
showed that unrecognized cases of hantavirus pulmonary
syndrome had preceded the 1993 outbreak by at least 15
years (31). Similarly, cases of legionellosis and AIDS were
recognized in hindsight years after they had occurred (13).
These observations, coupled with the new laboratory tech-
niques for pathogen identification, particularly methods
that do not rely on culture, suggested that an effort to
prospectively identify pathogens causing unexplained syn-
dromes might yield useful information (12,13); this was
the beginning of the UNEX project. Laboratory evaluation
of cases includes traditional serologic and in vitro culture
diagnostic methods as well as molecular techniques. This
combined epidemiologic and laboratory approach is a hall-
mark feature of other EIP projects that study hepatitis,
acute respiratory diseases, and encephalitis (32).
The UNEX project has developed methods for evaluat-
ing severe syndromes indicating infection, including non-
culture-based methods to identify etiologic agents. From
May 1, 1995, to December 31, 1998, 137 illnesses meeting
the UNEX case definition were reported to participating
EIPs. After adjustments for age and race were made, this
number translates to an estimated 920 U.S. cases per year;
the overall annual incidence rates did not change during
this time. No differences were observed in the seasonal
distribution of cases of unexplained illnesses, nor did cases
cluster by time or place. The largest proportion of cases
was treated as a neurologic syndrome (29%), followed by
respiratory (27%) and cardiac (21%) syndromes.
Diagnostic testing through UNEX identified a cause in 34
(28%) of 122 cases from which specimens were available
(Table 2). 
Two recent outbreaks demonstrate the usefulness of the
approach developed for UNEX. During a 1999 outbreak of
Emerging Infectious Diseases • Vol. 9, No. 7, July 2003 785
SYNOPSES
Table 2. Infectious causes and explanations for unexplained deaths and critical illnesses cases, 1995–1998, California, Oregon, 
Connecticut, and Minnesota (n=34)
a,b 
Syndrome  Etiologic agent (n)  Tests (n) 
Neisseria meningitidis (4)  16S rDNA PCR (2), PCR (1), EIA IgM (1)
a 
Bartonella hensaelae (1)  PCR, IFA, IgG 
Bartonella spp. (2)  IFA, IgG 
Chlamydia pneumoniae (1)  MIF, IgG 
Mycoplasma pneumoniae (1)  EIA, IgM/IgG 
Cytomegalovirus (1)  EIA and IFA,IgG 
Coxsackie B virus (1)  EIA, IgM, viral culture 
Enterovirus (1)  EIA, IgM 
Epstein-Barr virus (1)  IFA, IgG (VCA and EA) 
Human herpesvirus 6 (1)  IFA and EIA (IgM and IgG) 
Neurologic (n=15) 
Mumps virus (1)  IFA IgM, IFA and EIA, IgG 
Chlamydia pneumoniae (2)  MIF IgG (2), IFA, IgM 
Mycoplasma pneumoniae (4)  PCR (blood), EIA, IgM/IgG 
Streptococcus pneumoniae (2)  16S rDNA PCR (pleural fluid) 
Legionella spp. (1)  PCR (from lung) 
Adenovirus (1)  EIA and IFA, IgG 
Influenza B virus (1)  EIA and IFA, IgG 
Influenza A virus (1)  EIA and IFA, IgM, EIA (IgG) 
Respiratory (n=13) 
Human parainfluenza virus types 1 and 3 (1)  EIA and IFA, IgG 
Borrelia burgdorferi/Ehrlichia chaffeensis (1)  EIA/IFA flagella, IgG, Western blot (IgG and IgM) 
Enterovirus (1)  EIA IgM 
Cardiac (n=3) 
Legionella spp. (1)  PCR (heart) 
Neisseria meningitidis (1)  PCR (cerebrospinal fluid) 
Adenovirus (1)  PCR (blood) 
Multisystem (n=3) 
Enterovirus (1)  IgM, EIA 
a PCR, polymerase chain reaction; EIA, enzyme immunosorbent assay; IFA, indirect immunofluorescent assay; Ig, immunoglobulin; EA, early antigens; VCA, viral capsid 
antigens; MIF, microimmunofluorescence.
  
bReference 12. West Nile encephalitis in the northeastern United States,
which was recognized by an alert clinician (33), and dur-
ing an outbreak of unexplained illness among injecting
drug users in Scotland and Ireland (34), initial reports of
illness were received and initial laboratory testing per-
formed through the laboratory infrastructure established
for the UNEX project. 
The frequency and distribution of the syndromes identi-
fied through this project undoubtedly reflect both the dis-
tribution of their occurrence and gaps in our ability to diag-
nose causes of neurologic and respiratory syndromes in
particular. Although novel pathogens have not yet been dis-
covered through the UNEX project, this systematic
approach improves chances of recognizing infectious dis-
ease causes earlier than in the past and lays the groundwork
for the development of improved diagnostic tools.
Moreover, concerns about bioterrorism have put a premi-
um on the early detection of an intentional release or infec-
tious or chemical agents; this syndrome-based surveil-
lance, which seeks early identification and diagnosis, can
contribute to public health preparedness for such events. 
Future Directions of EIPs
Since the release of the plan that launched the EIPs,
these programs have made substantial contributions to the
practice of U.S. public health. Using domestic EIPs as a
model, CDC has begun developing a network of interna-
tional EIPs (IEIPs) in collaboration with Ministries of
Health and other international partners. The first IEIP was
established in Thailand during 2001, and a second IEIP is
being established in Kenya. Collaborations between EIPs
and IEIPs will provide valuable opportunities for training.
In addition, the new U.S. EIP in New Mexico will feature
work along the U.S.-Mexico border and also promises to
enhance international collaborations. 
Opportunities presented by new laboratory and infor-
mation technologies, as well as challenges posed by poten-
tial bioterrorism, will influence the evolution of the EIPs
over the next several years. EIP work will build on experi-
ence gained through the combined epidemiologic and lab-
oratory evaluation of syndromes to enhance bioterrorism
preparedness and develop the capacity for identifying pre-
viously unrecognized pathogens. However, even as new
technologies are found, knowledgeable and engaged clini-
cians will remain a vital element in efforts to detect,
respond to, and prevent emerging infectious diseases. 
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